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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In 1981, Randy McKinney was convicted of first degree murder and certain other
offenses. He was initially sentenced to death. However, after extensive litigation in
state and federal courts for many years, Mr. McKinney eventually entered into an
agreement with the State calling for him to receive a fixed life sentence instead of a
death sentence. In 2009, he was re-sentenced to fixed life.
Following his re-sentencing, Mr. McKinney filed a motion to correct an illegal
sentence challenging the fixed life sentence. That motion, however, was denied, and
the district court’s denial of the motion was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court. See
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837 (2013).
Shortly after the Rule 35 appeal concluded in 2013, Mr. McKinney initiated the
present case by filing a petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, Mr. McKinney
asserted seven claims for relief, all relating to his re-sentencing in 2009. However, the
district court summarily dismissed the petition in its entirety.

Mr. McKinney has

appealed and, on appeal, he contends the district court erred in denying five of his
seven post-conviction claims—primarily because the court failed to give sufficient notice
of the reasons why those claims were ultimately dismissed.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The present post-conviction case has its roots in Mr. McKinney’s 1981 murder
conviction. In a prior appeal in 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court provided the following
summary of the relevant background:
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In 1981, a Bonneville County jury found McKinney guilty of
premeditated murder, felony murder, conspiracy to commit murder,
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. He admits in this appeal that
he and his girlfriend, Dovey Small, were hitchhiking through the state
when they stopped in Blackfoot, Idaho, to visit Small's sisters. While
there, McKinney and Small developed a plan to rob and kill Robert Bishop,
an acquaintance of one of Small's sisters. McKinney traveled with only
Bishop to a gravel pit near Arco, Idaho; shot Bishop to death; and took his
car and wallet.
McKinney originally was sentenced to death for first-degree murder,
in addition to prison sentences for his other crimes, but the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho found that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial.
McKinney v. Fisher, CV96–0177–S–BLW, 2009 WL 3151106, at *1, *19–
28 (D.Idaho Sept. 25, 2009). It is noteworthy that the jury's verdict was
not disturbed, as the federal court found that McKinney was “not entitled to
relief on any claims related to the guilt phase of his state court criminal
trial.” Id. at *1; see also id. at *7–19. It is not disputed that McKinney is
factually guilty of all of the crimes of which he was convicted.
In 2009, the Seventh District Court for Butte County resentenced
McKinney pursuant to an I.C.R. 11 sentencing agreement. The State
agreed neither to appeal the United States District Court's decision to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nor to seek the death penalty on
resentencing. In exchange, McKinney consented to a sentence of fixed
life without possibility of parole for first-degree murder, to be served
concurrently with his sentences for conspiracy to commit murder, robbery,
and conspiracy to commit robbery.
In 2010, McKinney filed his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentences
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. He claimed that the Idaho and federal double
jeopardy clauses barred his sentence for both first-degree murder and
robbery. He also claimed that Idaho’s multiple-punishment statute,
I.C. § 18–301 (repealed 1995), barred his sentences for the underlying
substantive crimes of murder and robbery in addition to the conspiracies
to commit those crimes, so that only the conspiracy sentences remained
valid.
The district court denied McKinney’s Rule 35 Motion. First, the
district court acknowledged that robbery is a lesser included offense of
felony murder, but held that it is not a lesser included offense of
premeditated murder. Because the jury separately found that McKinney
committed premeditated murder, he could properly be punished for both
murder and robbery. Second, the district court declined to decide the
merits of McKinney’s I.C. § 18-301 claims because doing so would require
it to “reexamine the underlying facts” of the case, which it held is not
2

allowed in a Rule 35 proceeding. McKinney timely appealed to this Court,
and we affirm.
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 839-40 (2013) (footnotes omitted). In that appeal,
the Supreme Court observed that Mr. McKinney was convicted of first degree murder
under both “premeditation” and “felony-murder” theories and, therefore, it concluded he
was re-sentenced under both theories. Id. at 841 & n.7. Having so found, the Court
held that, while the underlying felonies may have been lesser-included offenses under
the felony-murder theory, they were not under the premeditation theory, and so there
was no double jeopardy violation. Id. at 841. The Court also held that Mr. McKinney
was not entitled to relief under section 19-301 because any violation of that statute was
not clear from the face of the record. Id. at 842.
A few months after the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in his Rule 35
appeal, Mr. McKinney filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief. (See R., pp.6-12;
see also R., pp.13-33 (memorandum of law in support of petition).) In his petition,
Mr. McKinney asserted the following seven claims for relief:
1.

“Whether . . . the convictions for felony murder, robbery, conspiracy to
commit robbery, [and] conspiracy to commit are illegal because they
violate constitutional and statutory prohibitions against double jeopardy,
and multiple punishments for the same action” (R., p.8.);

2.

“Whether . . . upon re-sentencing, and pursuant to the binding plea
agreement, the Petitioner was sentenced for ‘premeditated Murder,’ or . . .
for ‘First Degree Murder’ (Felony Murder), and [whether] to continue to
refer to the sentence and conviction as Premeditated Murder is not correct
and violates Due Process” (R., p.8);
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3.

“Whether . . . the sentence imposed (whether . . . agreed upon by all
parties), is illegal, as there was no provision in the laws, at the time of the
commission of the offenses, for the Court to impose a ‘Fixed life’
sentence. (The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose such a
term.)” (R., p.8);

4.

Whether petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel insofar
as his counsel, in negotiating the agreement which led to his resentencing, told him he would be re-sentenced on “first degree murder,
(Felony Murder), NOT premeditated murder” (R., pp.8, 9);

5.

Whether petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel insofar
as his counsel, during his re-sentencing, failed to argue “that all of the
convictions should have been merged into the ‘Felony Murder’ conviction”
and, therefore, resulted in “multiple punishments for the same actions”
(R., pp.8, 9);

6.

Whether petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel insofar
as his counsel failed to recognized that, at the time of his offense, Idaho
law did not allow for imposition of a fixed life sentence and, therefore,
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for allowing him to receive a
fixed life sentence (R., pp.8, 9); and
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7.

Whether petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel insofar
as his counsel failed to consult with him about filing an appeal following
his re-sentencing (see R., pp.8, 9).1

The State filed an answer to Mr. McKinney’s petition. (See R., pp.42-44.) In that
answer, the State denied Mr. McKinney’s substantive allegations (R., pp.42, 43) and
asserted a number of affirmative defenses. (R., p.43.) A few months later, the State
also filed a very short boilerplate motion for summary dismissal. (See Supp. R., pp.2829.) It asserted three grounds for dismissal: (a) the petition is barred by the statute of
limitations; (b) as a term of his agreement with the State, Mr. McKinney “waived his right
to appeal or seek post conviction relief” following his re-sentencing2; and (c) the petition
is not supported by evidence. (See Supp. R., pp.28-29.)
Eventually, a short hearing was held on the State’s motion to dismiss. At that
hearing, the State reiterated the reasons why it believed Mr. McKinney’s petition ought
to be dismissed: (a) it is barred by the statute of limitations (Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.6, L.5), (b)
the same issues raised in this petition were previously decided in Mr. McKinney’s
“original appeals and the original post-conviction relief”3 (Tr., p.6, Ls.5-10) or in the

The petition itself does not identify the district court order Mr. McKinney was referring
to when he alleged his counsel was ineffective for failing to consult on appeal (see
R., p.9); however, his memorandum of law in support of petition clarified that he was
referring to the judgment entered following his re-sentencing (see R., p.33).
2 The State provided the district court with a copy of the re-sentencing agreement. (See
Supp. R., pp.30-36.) It includes a clear waiver of appellate rights. (See Supp.
R., pp.33, 34.) However, it is completely silent as to post-conviction rights. (See Supp.
R., pp.30-36.) Thus, the State’s claim that Mr. McKinney waived his right to seek postconviction relief was false.
3 It does not appear that any double jeopardy issues were at stake in Mr. McKinney’s
original direct appeal, see State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180 (1984), or in his original
post-conviction appeal, see McKinney v. State, 115 Idaho 1125 (1989). Further,
Mr. McKinney could not have challenged events related to his 2009 re-sentencing in his
1
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subsequent Rule 35 appeal (Tr., p.10, Ls.13-22); (c) it is a successive petition for postconviction relief (Tr., p.6, Ls.10-17); (d) there is no evidence to support Mr. McKinney’s
claims (Tr., p.6, Ls.23-24); and (e) Mr. McKinney waived his right to file a postconviction petition (see Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.8).4

Mr. McKinney’s counsel

acknowledged that some of Mr. McKinney’s contentions had previously been addressed
in his Rule 35 appeal. (See Tr., p.9, Ls.21-25.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court indicated it would grant the
State’s motion for summary dismissal for two reasons: first, “this is a successive appeal
over the same issues under -4908”; second, Mr. McKinney agreed to the fixed life
sentence and waived his right to appeal, “so it would make no sense to have a Rule 35
motion.” (See Tr., p.11, Ls.10-21.) Later though, the district court entered a written
order providing a more cogent explanation of the reasons for dismissal. (See R., pp.5255.) With regard to each of Mr. McKinney’s claims, the district court ruled as follows:
1.

Claim #1 (the merger claim): This claim is subject to dismissal because
the legal question at issue was previously decided by the Idaho Supreme
Court in 2013 in Mr. McKinney’s Rule 35 appeal, and it was decided
against Mr. McKinney. (R., p.53.)

2.

Claim #2 (the claim seeking a distinction between “premeditated murder”
and “first degree murder” (a/k/a “felony murder”)): This claim is “frivolous”;

original direct appeal and post-conviction cases, as that re-sentencing did not occur
until 20 years after the original post-conviction appeal ended.
4 The prosecutor acknowledged that the agreement did not explicitly bar the filing of a
post-conviction petition; he argued that because “the law requires an appeal to be taken
before a post-conviction relief petition filed,” a waiver of the right to an appeal is
necessarily a waiver of the right to file a post-conviction petition. (Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11,
L.8.)
6

it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; it fails to allege
any specific violation of the law; and it is based on an unbelievable factual
premise (that in agreeing to re-sentencing, “‘the State would gratuitously
absolve McKinney of serving any sentence whatsoever for premeditated
murder.’” (R., pp.53-54 (quoting McKinney, 153 Idaho at 837).)
3.

Claim #3 (the claim that the fixed life sentence is illegal because such a
sentence did not exist when Mr. McKinney’s crime was committed): This
claim fails as a matter of law because a fixed life sentence was a
permissible sentence for first degree murder in 1981. (R., p.54.)

4.

Claim #4 (the claim that counsel was ineffective for telling Mr. McKinney
he would be re-sentenced on “first degree murder, (Felony Murder), not
premeditated murder”): This claim is subject to dismissal because
Mr. McKinney “assert[ed] no facts contrary to the record”; the district court
“specifically told Petitioner the charge in which he was going to be
sentenced”; Mr. McKinney failed to allege prejudice; and Mr. McKinney
waived any double jeopardy violation by entering into the re-sentencing
agreement. (R., p.54.)

5.

Claim #5 (claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to make a double
jeopardy objection at the re-sentencing hearing): This claim is subject to
dismissal because counsel’s performance could not have been deficient,
and could not have prejudiced Mr. McKinney, because any double
jeopardy argument by counsel would have undermined the re-sentencing
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agreement; further, Mr. McKinney’s merger argument fails as a matter of
law, as was determined in 2013 in his Rule 35 appeal. (R., p.54.)
6.

Claim #6 (claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
imposition of a fixed life sentence as being an illegal sentence): This claim
fails as a matter of law because any objection to the sentence would have
been groundless, as a fixed life sentence was a legal sentence for first
degree murder in 1981. (R., pp.54-55.)

7.

Claim #7 (claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with
Mr. McKinney about an appeal): This claim “has no basis in fact, and is
without merit”; the district court “specifically addressed this issue on the
record with Petitioner” at his re-sentencing; and “Petitioner has not offered
any facts or allegations contrary to the transcript of how this issue could
create prejudice.” (R., p.55.)

The same day the district court entered its summary dismissal order, it also
entered a judgment in favor of the State. (R., p.56.) Twelve days later, Mr. McKinney
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.57-60.) On appeal, Mr. McKinney contends the
district court erred in denying five of his seven post-conviction claims—primarily
because the court failed to give prior notice of the reasons why those claims were
ultimately dismissed.

8

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing most of Mr. McKinney’s postconviction claims?

9

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Dismissing Five Of Mr. Mckinney’s Post-Conviction Claims—
Primarily Because It Failed To Give Prior Notice Of The Reasons For Dismissal
Mr. McKinney contends that the district court erred in dismissing five of his seven
post-conviction claims (Claims 2, 3, 4, 6 & 7). In each case, he argues he was given no
prior notice of the ultimate reasons for dismissal. And, with regard to one of his claims
(Claim 4), he also argues the district court erred as a matter of law.
A.

Applicable Legal Standards
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is separate and

distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction.
Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPCPA”) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911) and the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456.

Because it is a civil

proceeding, the petitioner must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995). However, the petition
initiating post-conviction proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A
post-conviction petition is required to include more than “a short and plain statement of
the claim”; it “must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached.”
Id.; I.C. § 19-4903. “In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to
dismissal.” Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998).
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Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of post-conviction petitions where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. I.C. § 19 4906(c). In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard,
the district court need not “accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.” Martinez,
126 Idaho at 816-17. However, if the petitioner presents some evidentiary support for
his allegations, the district court must take the petitioner’s allegations as true, at least
until such time as they are controverted by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643,
646 (1968). This is so even if the allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. Thus,
only after the State controverts the petitioner’s allegations can the district court consider
the evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must
still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner,
Small, 132 Idaho at 331.
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at 331. If there is no
question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can
be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State’s motion. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c).
If the district court orders dismissal sua sponte, it must first give the petitioner
twenty days’ notice and allow the petitioner to respond to the notice. I.C. § 19-4906(b).
The purpose of this requirement is to give the petitioner an opportunity to challenge the
decision before it is finalized. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159-60 (Ct. App.
1986). Thus, this requirement is strict; it makes no difference whether the petitioner’s
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claims are meritorious or not. Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 129-30 (1978).
Moreover, vague notice of the district court’s intent to dismiss is insufficient. The district
court must be specific as to the bases for the intended dismissal so as to provide the
petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to respond. Banks v. State, 123 Idaho 953, 954
(1993). It is not sufficient to merely recite the language from section 19-4906 and state
a conclusion. Id. If the district court fails to give the petitioner the required notice and
opportunity to respond, or if the district court’s notice is impermissibly vague, the petition
must be reinstated. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456-57, 458 (failure to give any notice); Banks,
123 Idaho at 954 (notice was impermissibly vague).
If the district court orders dismissal in response to a sufficiently specific motion, it
need not provide the petitioner with notice and an opportunity to respond because the
motion itself is viewed as providing notice to the petitioner. Saykhamchone v. State,
127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995); Baruth, 110 Idaho at 159. In such cases, however, the
motion must be specific as to the bases for the requested dismissal—again, to provide
the petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to respond. Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at
322 (“[T]he state’s prayer for relief in the Answer was deficient for not stating its grounds
with particularity, and for not stating that it was the state’s motion for summary
disposition under I.C. § 19-4906(c).”). Cf. Banks, 123 Idaho at 954 (although discussing
sua sponte dismissals, noting that echoing the legal standard set forth in the statute,
then concluding that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, is not sufficiently specific
notice of the reason(s) for dismissal). If the motion is not specific, any dismissal granted
by the district court will be treated as a sua sponte dismissal and will be subject to the
notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b). Martinez, 126 Idaho at 818. Likewise, if the
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district court dismisses a petition on grounds other than those stated in the motion, it too
will be treated as a sua sponte dismissal subject to the notice requirement. Baruth, 110
Idaho at 159.
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never involve the
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal
order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03, 128 P.3d 938, 939-40 (2006).

B.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Claim #2
In his second claim for relief, Mr. McKinney alleged that, “upon re-sentencing,

and pursuant to the binding plea agreement, the Petitioner was sentenced for
‘premeditated Murder,’ or . . . for ‘First Degree Murder’ (Felony Murder),” and that “to
continue to refer to the sentence and conviction as Premeditated Murder is not correct
and violates Due Process.” (R., p.8.)
In seeking summary dismissal of Mr. McKinney’s petition, the State enumerated
a list of reasons for dismissal, none of which were tied to this claim specifically. That list
was as follows: (a) the petition is barred by the statute of limitations (Supp. R.,p.28;
Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.6, L.5); (b) as a term of his agreement with the State, Mr. McKinney
“waived his right to appeal or seek post conviction relief” following his re-sentencing
(Supp. R., pp.28-29; see Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.8); (c) the petition is not supported by
evidence (Supp. R., p.29; Tr.. p.6, Ls.23-24); (d) the same issues raised in this petition
were previously decided in Mr. McKinney’s “original appeals and the original postconviction relief” (Tr., p.6, Ls.5-10) or in the subsequent Rule 35 appeal (Tr., p.10,
Ls.13-22); and (e) it is a successive petition for post-conviction relief (Tr., p.6, Ls.10-17).
13

In its summary dismissal order, the district court dismissed Claim #2 on different
grounds. The district court reasoned that Claim #2 is “frivolous”; it fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted; it fails to allege any specific violation of the law; and it
is based on an unbelievable factual premise (that in agreeing to re-sentencing, the State
was proceeding only on a felony-murder theory and was no longer pursuing a
premeditated murder theory). (R., pp.53-54.) Because the district court’s reasons for
dismissing this claim differed from the reasons identified in the State’s arguments in
support of summary dismissal, Mr. McKinney had no prior notice of the ultimate reasons
for dismissal. Therefore, the district court erred. See Baruth, 110 Idaho at 159. This
claim should be remanded to the district court for proper notice and an opportunity for
Mr. McKinney to respond.

C.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Claim #3
In his third claim for relief, Mr. McKinney alleged that, “the sentence imposed

(whether . . . agreed upon by all parties), is illegal, as there was no provision in the laws,
at the time of the commission of the offenses, for the Court to impose a ‘Fixed life’
sentence.

(The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose such a term.)”

(R., p.8.)
In seeking summary dismissal of Mr. McKinney’s petition, the State enumerated
a list of reasons for dismissal, none of which were tied to this claim specifically. That list
was as follows: (a) the petition is barred by the statute of limitations (Supp. R., p.28;
Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.6, L.5); (b) as a term of his agreement with the State, Mr. McKinney
“waived his right to appeal or seek post conviction relief” following his re-sentencing
(Supp. R., pp.28-29; see Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.8); (c) the petition is not supported by
14

evidence (Supp. R., p.29; Tr.. p.6, Ls.23-24); (d) the same issues raised in this petition
were previously decided in Mr. McKinney’s “original appeals and the original postconviction relief” (Tr., p.6, Ls.5-10) or in the subsequent Rule 35 appeal (Tr., p.10,
Ls.13-22); and (e) it is a successive petition for post-conviction relief (Tr., p.6, Ls.10-17).
In its summary dismissal order, the district court dismissed Claim #3 on different
grounds. The district court reasoned that this claim fails as a matter of law because a
fixed life sentence was, in fact, a permissible sentence for first degree murder in 1981.
(R., p.54.) Because the district court’s reasons for dismissing this claim differed from
the reasons identified in the State’s arguments in support of summary dismissal,
Mr. McKinney had no prior notice of the ultimate reasons for dismissal. Therefore, the
district court erred. See Baruth, 110 Idaho at 159. This claim should be remanded to
the district court for proper notice and an opportunity for Mr. McKinney to respond.

D.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Claim #4
In his fourth claim for relief, Mr. McKinney alleged that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel insofar as his counsel, in negotiating the agreement
which led to his re-sentencing in 2009, told him he would be re-sentenced on “first
degree murder, (Felony Murder), NOT premeditated murder.” (R., pp.8, 9.)
In seeking summary dismissal of Mr. McKinney’s petition, the State enumerated
a list of reasons for dismissal, none of which were tied to this claim specifically. That list
was as follows: (a) the petition is barred by the statute of limitations (Supp. R.,p.28;
Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.6, L.5); (b) as a term of his agreement with the State, Mr. McKinney
“waived his right to appeal or seek post conviction relief” following his re-sentencing
(Supp. R., pp.28-29; see Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.8); (c) the petition is not supported by
15

evidence (Supp. R., p.29; Tr.. p.6, Ls.23-24); (d) the same issues raised in this petition
were previously decided in Mr. McKinney’s “original appeals and the original postconviction relief” (Tr., p.6, Ls.5-10) or in the subsequent Rule 35 appeal (Tr., p.10,
Ls.13-22); and (e) it is a successive petition for post-conviction relief (Tr., p.6, Ls.10-17).
In its summary dismissal order, the district court dismissed Claim #4 on different
grounds. The district court reasoned that Claim #4 was subject to dismissal because
Mr. McKinney “assert[ed] no facts contrary to the record”; the district court “specifically
told Petitioner the charge in which he was going to be sentenced”; Mr. McKinney failed
to allege prejudice; and Mr. McKinney waived any double jeopardy argument by
entering into the re-sentencing agreement. (R., p.54.) Because the district court’s
reasons for dismissing this claim differed from the reasons identified in the State’s
arguments in support of summary dismissal, Mr. McKinney had no prior notice of the
ultimate reasons for dismissal. Therefore, the district court erred. See Baruth, 110
Idaho at 159. This claim should be remanded to the district court for proper notice and
an opportunity for Mr. McKinney to respond.
Furthermore, the district court was incorrect insofar as it ruled that this claim was
waived when Mr. McKinney entered into his agreement with the State. That agreement
contains no waiver of post-conviction rights.5 (See Supp. R., pp.30-35.)

Further, any such waivers would, at a minimum, be disfavored. See, e.g., United
States Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Press Release: Attorney General
Holder Announces New Policy to Enhance Justice Department's Commitment to
Support Defendants' Right to Counsel (Oct. 14, 2014) (available at <www.justice.gov>)
(“Attorney General Eric Holder . . . announced today that the Department of Justice will
no longer ask criminal defendants who plead guilty to waive their right to bring future
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.”); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA
Resolution 113E (2013) (available at <www.americanbar.org>) (opposing “plea or
sentencing agreements that waive a criminal defendant’s post-conviction claims

5
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E.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Claim #6
In his sixth claim for relief, Mr. McKinney alleged that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel insofar as his counsel failed to recognize that, at the time of
Mr. McKinney’s offense Idaho law did not allow for imposition of a fixed life sentence for
first degree murder and, therefore, was ineffective for allowing him to receive a fixed life
sentence under the re-sentencing agreement. (R., pp.8, 9.)
In seeking summary dismissal of Mr. McKinney’s petition, the State enumerated
a list of reasons for dismissal, none of which were tied to this claim specifically. That list
was as follows: (a) the petition is barred by the statute of limitations (Supp. R.,p.28;
Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.6, L.5); (b) as a term of his agreement with the State, Mr. McKinney
“waived his right to appeal or seek post conviction relief” following his re-sentencing
(Supp. R., pp.28-29; see Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.8); (c) the petition is not supported by
evidence (Supp. R., p.29; Tr.. p.6, Ls.23-24); (d) the same issues raised in this petition
were previously decided in Mr. McKinney’s “original appeals and the original postconviction relief” (Tr., p.6, Ls.5-10) or in the subsequent Rule 35 appeal (Tr., p.10,
Ls.13-22); and (e) it is a successive petition for post-conviction relief (Tr., p.6, Ls.10-17).
In its summary dismissal order, the district court dismissed Claim #6 on different
grounds. The district court reasoned that Claim #6 was subject to dismissal because
any objection to the sentence would have been groundless, as a fixed life sentence was
addressing ineffective assistance of counsel . . . unless based on past instances of such
conduct that are specifically identified in the plea or sentencing agreement or transcript
of the proceedings”); National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, NACDL Ethics
Advisory Committee, Formal Opinion 12-02 (2012) (available at <www.nacdl.org>)
(concluding it is unethical for a criminal defense lawyer participate in plea agreements
calling for waivers of defendants’ rights to collaterally attack convictions, in part,
because waivers of ineffective assistance claims create inherent conflicts of interest for
defense lawyers).
17

a legal sentence for first degree murder in 1981. (R., pp.54-55.) Because the district
court’s reasons for dismissing this claim differed from the reasons identified in the
State’s arguments in support of summary dismissal, Mr. McKinney had no prior notice of
the ultimate reasons for dismissal. Therefore, the district court erred. See Baruth, 110
Idaho at 159. This claim should be remanded to the district court for proper notice and
an opportunity for Mr. McKinney to respond.

F.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Claim #7
In his seventh claim for relief, Mr. McKinney alleged that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel insofar as his counsel failed to consult with him about
filing an appeal following his re-sentencing (see R., pp.8, 9).
In seeking summary of dismissal of Mr. McKinney’s petition, the State
enumerated a list of reasons for dismissal, none of which were tied to this claim
specifically.

That list was as follows:

(a) the petition is barred by the statute of

limitations (Supp. R.,p.28; Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.6, L.5); (b) as a term of his agreement with
the State, Mr. McKinney “waived his right to appeal or seek post conviction relief”
following his re-sentencing (Supp. R., pp.28-29; see Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.8); (c) the
petition is not supported by evidence (Supp. R., p.29; Tr.. p.6, Ls.23-24); (d) the same
issues raised in this petition were previously decided in Mr. McKinney’s “original
appeals and the original post-conviction relief” (Tr., p.6, Ls.5-10) or in the subsequent
Rule 35 appeal (Tr., p.10, Ls.13-22); and (e) it is a successive petition for postconviction relief (Tr., p.6, Ls.10-17).
In its summary dismissal order, the district court dismissed Claim #7 on different
grounds. The district court reasoned that Claim #7 was subject to dismissal because: it
18

“has no basis in fact, and is without merit”; the district court “specifically addressed this
issue on the record with Petitioner” at his re-sentencing; and “Petitioner has not offered
any facts or allegations contrary to the transcript of how this issue could create
prejudice.” (R., p.55.) Because the district court’s reasons for dismissing this claim
differed from the reasons identified in the State’s arguments in support of summary
dismissal, Mr. McKinney had no prior notice of the ultimate reasons for dismissal.
Therefore, the district court erred. See Baruth, 110 Idaho at 159. This claim should be
remanded to the district court for proper notice and an opportunity for Mr. McKinney to
respond.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. McKinney respectfully requests that this
Court find the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction
relief, and that it vacate the district court’s judgment and summary dismissal order, and
remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of June, 2016.

_________/s/________________
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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